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COMPETING LIABILITIES: RESPONDING TO
EVIDENCE OF CHILD ABUSE THAT SURFACES
DURING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
Alison Beyea*
Kevin Adams, a practicing attorney in Maine, represents John Brown in a
dispute with Brown's landlord. Brown is facing eviction as a result of his inability
to pay the rent. Over the course of the representation, Adams has come to believe
that Brown is abusing his son. Brown-who is working two jobs but still cannot
pay his rent-has told Adams of the incredible pressure he is facing. Brown has
admitted that the pressure is getting to him and that he feels bad that he has been
"taking it out on the kid." Brown also told Adams that he had been attending anger
management meetings, but that he no longer had time to participate. Adams has
met Brown's son on two occasions. At the first meeting, Brown's son had a black
eye and at the second meeting, Adams could see that Brown's son had bruises all
over his arm. The last time Adams met with Brown, Brown mentioned that he had
spent the previous evening in the emergency room of the hospital because his son
had broken his arm.
What should Adams do in this situation? And, is that different from what
Adams can do? Could a failure to report suspected abuse expose Adams to future
civil liability for the child's injuries under the theory of "failure to warn?" On the
other hand, is Adams's ability to report this suspected abuse constrained by profes-
sional ethical rules that protect information gained in the course of representation?
Could disclosure of such information actually subject Adams to disciplinary ac-
tion from the Board of Bar Overseers? To answer these questions, an attorney
must consider and evaluate his or her obligations under tort law, ethical rules, and
legislative enactments. This Article will consider these competing "liabilities"
and will argue that an attorney in Maine has the discretion to report child abuse
without violating her ethical or legal obligations. 1 Although this Article calls for a
policy of "permissive reporting," it concludes that any attempt to mandate report-
ing would be a misguided attempt to protect children.
A discussion of an attorney's legal and ethical relationship to the reporting of
child abuse is impossible without first considering the nature of the crime of child
*Alison Beyea is serving as a law clerk to Judge Kermit Lipez of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit. Upon the completion of her clerkship, Ms. Beyea will be joining
Pine Tree Legal Assistance in Portland, Maine, as a Muskie Fellow for legal services. This
article is an expansion of a student paper Ms. Beyea wrote while attending the University of
Maine School of Law.
1. Were an attorney to make such a report, that decision would obviously call into question
that attorney's ability to represent the client. Most likely, withdrawal would be necessary. It is
beyond the scope of this Article, however, to consider the resulting attorney-client relationship
once a report has been made. Instead, this Article attempts to address the more fundamental
question: can an attorney ever report child abuse if the information is obtained in the course of
representation? This Article leaves the other equally difficult questions pertaining to the result
on the attorney client relationship for future consideration.
Similarly, this Article does not consider the attorney's obligations when representing a client
charged with child abuse in a criminal proceeding. In that case, disclosure of known abuse
would implicate the client's constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel.
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abuse and its growing impact on larger and larger segments of the population; Part
I analyzes this impact. Part II will consider whether tort law could effect an
attorney's duty to report child abuse. Part I will analyze the effect of the ethical
rules governing confidentiality on an attorney's ability to disclose child abuse when
the information is obtained in the course of representation. Part IV will evaluate
the application of mandatory reporting laws to attorneys. Finally, Part V will ar-
gue that, although attorneys should be encouraged to disclose child abuse in the
appropriate circumstances, attorneys should not have a mandatory duty to report.
I. CHILD ABUSE 2 IS A CONTINUING CRIME
Alexander was born in January of 1988 and Mason in March of 1992. The evi-
dence reflected that the children had suffered inadequately explained injuries. In
August 1994, the mother had taken Alexander to the hospital with a swollen right
testicle and broken nose, injuries that were determined to be four days old. In
November 1994, Alexander was taken to the hospital for another nose injury that
the mother explained was caused by being hit by a ball. Alexander, however, did
not say that he was hit by a ball. In December 1994, Alexander was hospitalized
for a laceration to the forehead that the mother indicated (and Alexander reported
to the treating doctor) occurred when he struck his head on a bookcase at school.
According to the school guidance counselor, however, no such injury occurred at
school. In February of 1995, Mason was hospitalized for a laceration to his fore-
head. The treating doctor found multiple bruises to his head, neck, stomach,
penis, and buttocks, determined to have been "inflicted injuries." 3
This quotation, taken from one of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's more
recent opinions upholding the termination of parental rights and responsibilities,
describes the most distinctive attribute of child abuse-its ongoing nature. 4 Child
abuse is a pattern of behavior. "Child abuse is not simply a crime which occurs at
a single point in time and then ceases; it is a past, present andfuture crime." 5 This
dynamic was first recognized in 19626 when a group of doctors published the
2. The types of child abuse differ. See U.S. DB'T oF HATa Aim HutiQ Strvicers, CtuLe
MA-REA-miEw 1996: REPos FROM THE STATES To Tm NATIONAL Ctt.D AnusE ArN NEGLEcr DATA
SytsEi 2-7 (1998). Nonetheless, abuse can be broken down into four general categories: physi-
cal abuse, neglect, sexual abuse, and emotional abuse. See id. Neglect is the most commonly
reported form and represented approximately 52% of the substantiated cases in 1996. Physical
abuse accounted for 24% of substantiated cases and sexual abuse represented 12% of substanti-
ated cases. Finally, emotional abuse made up another 6%, and 3% were victims of medical
neglect. See id, Many of these children suffer more than one type of abuse. See id.
3. In re Alexander D., 1998 ME 207, U 2-3, 716 A.2d 222, 224.
4. See generally, Nancy E. Stuart, Note, Child Abuse Reporting: A Challenge to Attorney-
Client Confidentiality, 1 Gao. 1. LEGAL Emics 243, 246 (1987). See also Robert L Burgess &
Lise M. Youngblade, Social Incompetence and Intergenerational Transmission ofAbusive pa-
rental Policies, in FAhu-y ABUSE AN ITs CONSEQUENc.. NEw DuamcnoN iN RasEAncn 38 (Gerald
T. Hotaling et al. eds. 1988) (pointing to the increased likelihood of abused children themselves
becoming abusers).
5. Stuart, supra note 4, at 246.
6. Although there were sporadic medical reports documenting suspicious combinations of
injuries in the 1940s and 1950s, the 1962 article drew substantial public attention to the problem
of child abuse. In 1974, the federal government became actively involved in the prevention of
child abuse with the passage of The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L No. 93-
247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107). The Act established the National Center
on Child Abuse and Neglect to serve as a clearinghouse for information and research. The Act
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seminal article, "The Battered Child Syndrome."'7 The lead author, Dr. Kempe,
explained that, "experiences with the repetitive nature of injuries indicate that an
adult who has once injured a child is likely to repeat .... [T]he child must be
considered to be in grave danger unless his environment can be proved to be safe."8
In later works edited by Dr. Kempe, doctors warned that:
[I]t would appear from our investigations that the severe permanent damage as-
sociated with the "battered child syndrome" usually does not occur with the ini-
tial incident. Identification of abuse at this time thus offers an opportunity for
intervention with the goal of preventing subsequent trauma and irreversible in-
jury to the child.9
The battered child syndrome has been widely accepted by the medical com-
munity; its ongoing nature is a critical component of the diagnosis. 10 Child abuse
is defined as "a multitude of nonaccidental physical and psychological traumas to
children, in the vast majority of cases, over an extended period of time." 1
Dr. Kempe's introduction of the battered child syndrome as a medical diagno-
sis for child abuse has also been widely accepted in the courts. Many jurisdictions,
including Maine, 12 permit expert testimony on the battered child syndrome, find-
ing such testimony to be both relevant and reliable. 13 In one of the earlier deci-
sions to discuss the syndrome, the Supreme Court of California recognized that:
also provided that states would receive federal funds if they met certain standards aimed at
protecting children. Among the necessary requirements for states to receive federal funds were
the enactment of child abuse reporting laws which would assure immunity and confidentiality to
a reporter of child abuse, the enactment of procedures to conduct prompt and thorough investi-
gations into allegations of maltreatment, the maintenance of a statewide system to ensure that
child abuse cases were dealt with effectively, a guarantee that every child in abuse or neglect
proceedings would be provided with a guardian ad litem, and a method of disseminating infor-
mation about the problem of child abuse and neglect and available treatment programs. Al-
though some states had enacted laws that imposed mandatory or permissive reporting of child
abuse, for others, the 197*4 Act encouraged a more comprehensive response to child abuse. See
DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSs AND NEGLECr: POLICY AND PRACICn
(1988). See also Elizabeth D. Hutchinson, Mandatory Reporting Laws: Child Protective Case
Finding Gone Awry?, 38 Soc. WORK 56 (1993).
7. C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962).
8. Id.
9. Stanford B. Friedman, The Need for Intensive Follow-Up ofAbused Children, in HErLINO
THE BATERED CHILD AND His FAMILY 79 (C. Henry Kempe et al eds. 1972) (footnote omitted).
10. See, e.g., Brown, The Battered Child Syndrome, 21 J. OF FORENSIC Sci. 65 (1976); Carlos
J. Sivit et al., Viceral Injury in Battered Children: A Changing Perspective, 137 RADIOLOOY 659
(1989); Zumwald & Hirsch, Pathology of Fatal ChildAbuse and Neglect in THE BA'rmRED CILD
247 (Ray E. Heifer & Ruth S. Kempe eds. 4 ed. 1987).
11. Gertrude J. Rubin Williams, Child Abuse in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHIOLOOY
1219, 1220 (C. Eugene Walker & Michael C. Roberts eds., 1983).
12. See State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167, 172 (Me. 1984) (holding trial court erred in exclud-
ing State's expert witness testimony about battered child syndrome).
13. See State v. Koon, 730 So. 2d 503 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (holding evidence of victim's prior
injuries relevant to intent requirement of second degree murder and evidence of prior injuries
reliable as doctor had necessary credentials and his methodology was sound); United States v.
Boise, 916 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding evidence of battered child syndrome relevant to
intent and absence of accident); State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332 (Ohio 1998) (holding trial
court erred in prohibiting expert testimony on "battered child syndrome" in support of claim of
self defense both because evidence was relevant and expert was reliable and listing states where
expert testimony is admissible); State v. Moorman, 670 A.2d 81, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996) (collecting cases where battered child syndrome is recognized as having a reliable scien-
tific basis).
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[it] appears from the professional literature that one of the distinguishing charac-
teristics of the battered child syndrome is that the assault on the victim is not an
isolated, atypical event but part of an environmental mosaic of repeated beatings
and abuse that will not only continue but will become more severe unless there is
appropriate medicolegal intervention. 14
The repetitive nature of child abuse goes beyond the experience of the victim.
A recurring theme in the child abuse literature is that abused children become
abusive parents. 15 Estimations of the rate of intergenerational transmission of
abuse range from 7 to 70%.16 Although recently there has been some questioning
of the reliability of the studies that indicate that there is an intergenerational trans-
mission of abuse, 17 it is still the "premiere" hypothesis in the child abuse field to
explain the causes of abuse. 18
Aside from its repetitive nature, there are other distinctive characteristics of
child abuse which distinguish it from other crimes. 19 The victim is often too young
or too intimidated to object. According to the data compiled by Child Protective
Services agencies in 1996, more than half of the victims of child abuse were seven
years old or younger, and one quarter were younger than four years old.2 0 Recent
studies indicate that of the 1,077 child abuse fatalities nationwide in 1996, chil-
dren ages three and younger accounted for 76% of these fatalities.2 1 The data also
show that the offender is most often a person in a parental role. Seventy-seven
percent of perpetrators of child abuse were parents of victims. An additional 11%
were other relatives of the victim.22
14. Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976).
15. There are a number of theories which attempt to explain the intergenerational transmis-
sion of abuse. The social learning theory posits that behavior is learned through modeling (we
observe and imitate the behavior of those around us) and instrumental learning (we learn by
being rewarded for our actions). Therefore, social learning theory postulates that abused chil-
dren learn to be aggressive, or, as it is commonly referred to, the child begins a "cycle of vio-
lence.' See Athena Garrett and Heather Libbey, NATIONAL INs~rr OF JuscE, Part 1 (1997)
Background Paper #2: Child Abuse Intervention Strategic Planning Meeting <http/ll
www.ojp.govlnijlchildabuse/bg2.html>. The attachment theory states that the type of bond that
develops between a child and care-giver effects the child's later relationships. Therefore, chil-
dren who are neglected and abused do not develop secure attachments to their care-givers and
this pattern carries over into adulthood. The theory is that the type of care-giving received as a
child is the type the child expects and recreates in adulthood. See id. Finally, the ecological
theory is a biological or genetic theory which assumes that a parent's predisposition to aggres-
sion or violence is inherited by a child. See Adam M. Tomison, Intergenerational Transmission
of Maltreatment, NATIONAL CHILD PROTCTvIE CLEARING HOUSE, Issue Paper No. 6 (Winter 1996).
16. See Tomison, supra note 15.
17. See id.
18. See Cathy Spatz Widom, Does Violence Beget Violence? A Critical Examination of the
Literature, 106 PSYCHOL BuLL. 3-28 (1989); see also Cathy Spatz Wlidom, The Cycle of No-
lence, Research in Brief, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, October 1992.
19. See, e.g., Stuart, supra note 4, at 248.
20. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HumAN Seavicas, CHu.o LtmxAT-u:%r 1996: RnrTSs
FROm THE STATES TO THE NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECr DATA SYSm-,, 2-9 (1996).
21. See id at2-13.
22. See id. at 2-14; see also U.S. DEPAmimmxr OF HALTH ANm HntAN SERvIcEs, THE TinuD
NATIONAL INciDENcE SwTUY OF CHiLD ABUSE AND NEGtzCr (NIS-3), 6-3 (1996) (concluding that
77.8% of perpetrators were birth parents, 13.6% were other parents or parent-substitutes, and
8.7% fell in the other category which included other family members, other unrelated adults and
others).
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The consequences of child abuse are severe. The physical effects include
bruises, skin markings, cuts, and bums. Some children experience extreme physi-
cal injuries including brain damage and death, and other severe health complica-
tions.2 3 The effects of abuse are not limited to bodily harm. Many children expe-
rience Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, the symptoms of which include anxiety,
nightmares, generalized fear response, depression, psycho-pathology, neurosis, char-
acter disorders, and trauma-specific fears.24 Often the abused child has separation
problems, lack of empathy, low self-esteem, and temperament problems.25 Devel-
opmentally, abused children often suffer from low verbal, cognitive and motor
abilities, language deficiencies, and regression and low performance on cognitive
tasks. 26 They also often struggle in school academically as well as in interper-
sonal interactions. 27 Abused children may have less social competence; they may
act out and display self-destructive behavior, physical aggression and antisocial
behavior.28
Not surprisingly, the child abuse victim is linked to future juvenile delinquency
and adult criminality. A recent unpublished study by Maxfield and Widom 29 found
that child abuse and neglect increases the risk for juvenile arrest by 59%, adult
arrest by 27%, and arrest for violent crime by 29%.30 Widom also found that
abused and neglected children are at an increased risk of being arrested for sex
crimes. 3 1 A 1983 study found that approximately 75% ofjuvenile delinquents and
prison inmates reported family histories of child abuse. 32
There are also serious economic repercussions of child abuse.33 Great ex-
pense is placed upon the child welfare systems and the public health organizations
that attempt to care for these children. A 1988 study found that over 30% of child
abuse victims had chronic health problems.34 The report concluded that if early
intervention had prevented only 20% of the abuse and neglect reported in 1983, a
minimum of ninety-seven million dollars could have been saved in initial hospital-
ization, mediation and foster care costs. 35
In 1996, child protective agencies in the fifty states and the District of Colum-
bia investigated more than two million reports alleging abuse of more than three
23. See Garrett and Libbey, supra note 15 (citing Cicchetti, D. and V. Carlson, Child Mal-
treatment: Theory and Research on the Causes and Consequences of Child Abuse and Neglect,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); see also Robin A. Rosencrantz, Rejecting "Hear
No Evil Speak No Evil": Expanding the Attorney's Role in Child Abuse Reporting, 8 GEo.J.
LEGAL Emaics 327 (Winter 1995).
24. See Garrett and Libbey, supra note 15.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See iL
31. See id.
32. See Relationship Between Child Abuse, Juvenile Delinquency, and Adult Criminality:
Hearing before Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
98th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1983).
33. See Rosencrantz, supra note 23, at 334.
34. See id. (citing American Association for Protection of Children (AAPC) and Natural
Clinical Evaluation Study).
35. See id. at 160; Deborah Daro, Confronting Child Abuse: Research for Effective Program
Design 149, 150 (1988).
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million children.36 According to the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data Sys-
tem (NCANDS) 1996 data collection, there was an 18% increase in the number of
cases of child abuse between 1990 and 1996.37 The results of the congressionally
mandated National Incidence Study of Child Abuse (NIS) found even more dra-
matic increases.38 Between the 1986 NIS study and the 1993 NIS study, the esti-
mated number of children who were abused and neglected increased 67% (from
931,000 children to 1,553,800).39 The estimated number of children who were
seriously injured quadrupled from 141,700 in 1986 to 565,000 in 1993.40
In 1997, there were 15,239 requests for child abuse and neglect services in
Maine.4 1 Of the 8,016 cases which were deemed appropriate for Child Protective
Services, only 4,591 were assigned for services.4 2 The remaining 3,425 cases
were never assigned due to a lack of resources. 43 The number of children the state
determined to be victims of child abuse and neglect increased by 23% between
1996 and 1997.
The child abuse victim is in a particularly vulnerable position in our society.
The victim cannot "walk away" from the abuse; the victim is almost always de-
pendent on the abuser for support and care. The consequences to the victim, as
well as to society as a whole, are severe and far reaching. Most significantly, child
abuse is almost always a repetitive or "continuing" crime; a past instance of abuse
is a likely indicator of future conduct. These unique attributes influence and effect
an attorney's legal duties and ethical obligations when confronted with confiden-
tial information of abuse.
IL TORT LIABILITY FOR A FAILURE TO WARN
In the hypothetical set forth at the beginning of this article, attorney Adams
believes that his client is abusing a child and inflicting significant injuries over
time. Putting aside any ethical constraints imposed by rules of ethical conduct,
does Adams run the risk of civil liability for failing to warn authorities or other
family members of the abuse?
Historically, at common law there was no affirmative obligation to act for the
protection of a third party. Over time, however, courts have modified and devel-
oped several exceptions to this rule which impose civil liability for a failure to
warn third parties of potential harm. Specifically, professionals who have a spe-
cial relationship with either the individual who poses the risk or the party at risk
may owe a duty to warn of potential harm. According to the Restatement (Second)
of Torts this duty proceeds as follows: "There is no duty so to control the conduct
of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless a
36. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HutA SERviCES, Ctinz MNl.nA mr 1996: Roars
FROM THm STATES TO THE NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE ANt) NEGLr=cr DATA Sysmi, 2-1 (1998).
37. See hi at 2-6.
38. See U.S. DEmRmir OF HEALTH AND Hu iA SERvicEs., THE THIRD NAno.4 INcwEsce
STUy OF CHaiD ABUSE AND NEGLECr (NIS-3) 3-3 (1996).
39. See id at 3-3.
40. See hi at 3-13.
41. See MAmE CHu DuEN's ALwANCE, MANE Kms CouNT DATA BOOK 17 (1999).
42. See id
43. See id.
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special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty
upon the actor to control the third person's conduct."4 4 The scope of "special
relationship" is not defined. Instead, the Restatement sets forth examples of those
relationships that rise to the level of a special relationship: parent-child, employer-
employee, possessor of land or chattels-licensee, and an individual in charge of
third persons with dangerous propensities.4 5
Does the attorney-client relationship actually give rise to a "special relation-
ship" that would impose an affirmative duty to act? No court has been confronted
with thisexact issue. Nonetheless, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia46 and Hawkins v. King County Rehabilitative Services,47 are cited by com-
mentators as authority for the proposition that, under certain circumstances, an
attorney might owe a duty to warn a third party even where the information was
obtained as a result of a confidential communication.4 8
In Tarasoff, Prosenjit Poddar, a student at the University of Berkeley, became
enamored with another student, Tatiana Tarasoff. Tarasoff rejected his advances,
and Poddar sought psychiatric help at the University. While in treatment, Poddar
revealed to his psychiatrist that he intended to kill Tarasoff. The psychiatrist de-
cided to have Poddar committed for observation. When the Campus police went
to obtain him, however, the police concluded that he was rational and not a threat
to Tarasoff. He was never admitted to the hospital for observation. Two months
later, Poddar murdered Tarasoff. At no time were either Tarasoff or her parents
warned of Poddar's threats.4 9
Tarasoff's parents sued the university on the theory "that Tarasoff's death proxi-
mately resulted from defendants' negligent failure to warn [Tarasoff] or others
likely to apprise her of her danger.' 50 The Superior Court rejected the plaintiffs'
claim, concluding that the facts did not give rise to a cause of action against the
therapist, the policemen involved or the Regents of the University of California as
their employer. 5 1
In reversing the Superior Court, the California Supreme Court first made clear
that considerations of policy weigh heavily in deciding when a duty of care is
owed to a third party.52 Quoting Professor Prosser, the court explained,
[t]he assertion that liability must.., be denied because defendant bears no "duty"
to plaintiff "begs the essential question-whether the plaintiff's interests are en-
titled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct... [Duty] is not sacro-
sanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of
policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protec-
tion." 53
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToms § 315 (1965).
45. See id. at §§ 316-319.
46. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
47. 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
48. See Christine A. Picker, The Intersection of Domestic Violence and Child Abuse: Ethical
Considerations and Tort Issues for Anorneys Who Represent Battered Women with Abused Chil-
dren, 12 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 69 (1993); Marc L. Sands, The Attorney's Affirmative Duty to
Warn Foreseeable Victims of a Client's Intended Violent Assault, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 355 (1986).
49. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d at 339-41.
50. Id. at 342.
51. Id. at 340.
52. See iL at 342.
53. Id. (quoting Wu.LIAm L. PossER, LAw or Toms 332-33 (3d ed. 1964).
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Of those policy considerations to be evaluated, the court noted that the most im-
portant to establishing the existence of a duty of care is foreseeability-a defen-
dant will owe a duty of care to those persons who are foreseeably endangered by
his conduct.54 Turning to the merits of Tarasoff's claim, the court explained that at
common law "as a general rule, one person owed no duty to control the conduct of
another." 55 The court went on to note that "the courts have carved out an excep-
tion to this rule in cases in which the defendant stands in some special relationship
to either the defendant and the dangerous person or the potential victim."56 The
court then applied this "exception" to the facts at hand and concluded that the
psychiatrist-patient relationship--by definition-created a special relationship that
supported an affirmative duty of care to a third party at risk.57 Accordingly, in
Tarasoff, the psychiatrist had a duty to warn the victim of the threats made against
her even if, in doing so, the psychiatrist would have to breach his pledge of confi-
dentiality to his client.58
The court acknowledged the force of the defendants' argument that "free and
open [and confidential] communication is essential to psychotherapy,"59 but con-
cluded the public interest in safety from violent assault outweighed professional
concerns for confidentiality.
In this risk-infested society we can hardly tolerate the further exposure to danger
that would result from a concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient
was lethal. If the exercise of reasonable care to protect the threatened victim
requires the therapist to warn the endangered party or those who can reasonably
be expected to notify him, we see no sufficient societal interest that would pro-
tect and justify concealment. The containment of such risks lies in the public
interest.60
The only reported case to apply the reasoning in Tarasoffto an attorney-client
relationship is Hawkins v. King County Rehabilitative Services.6 1 In Hawkins, a
mother sued her son's attorney for failing to disclose at a bail hearing the contents
of her son's psychiatric report, which indicated that the boy posed a threat to him-
self and others.62 The boy was released and, eight days later, assaulted his mother
and attempted suicide. The mother sued the son's attorney, alleging that the attor-
ney had a common law duty to warn foreseeable victims of the threat the boy
posed to third parties. 63
The Washington Appeals Court rejected the mother's suit on the facts, distin-
guishing the case from Tarasoff.64 The court concluded that the potential victim
(the mother) was aware that her son might be dangerous and, because the attorney
had no specific knowledge of an intended assault, the attorney did not have a duty
54. See iU
55. Id at 343.
56. l& at 343-44.
57. See id at 344-45.
58. See Udt at 347.
59. Id. at 346.
60. Id. at 347-48.
61. 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. CL App., 1979).
62. See id. at 363.
63. See idt
64. See id at 365.
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to warn.6 5 The court, however, embraced iri theory the concept of an affirmative
duty to warn on the part of an attorney. The court recognized that there is "com-
mon law support for the precept that attorneys must, upon learning that a client
plans an assault or other violent crime, warn foreseeable victims.' 66 The court
went further and noted that Washington precedent suggested a "willingness to limit
the attorney's duty of confidentiality when the values protected by that duty are
outweighed by other interests necessary to the administration of justice."67 The
court discussed the difficulty in balancing the "'public interest in safety from vio-
lent attack' against the public interest in securing proper resolution of legal dis-
putes without compromising a defendant's right to a loyal and zealous defense.' 68
The court concluded that, "the obligation to warn, when confidentiality would be
compromised to the client's detriment, must be permissive at most, unless it ap-
pears beyond a reasonable doubt that the client has formed a firm intention to
inflict serious personal injuries on an unknowing third person."'69
The Hawkins court did not analyze whether an attorney-client relationship
rose to the level of a "special relationship." Rather, it proceeded directly to a
discussion of what justifies a disclosure of confidential communications. This
omission suggests that the court concluded without discussion that the attorney-
client relationship automatically rises to the level of a special relationship. Given
the court's reasoning, on different facts-namely, where the attorney was the only
person with knowledge of the potential harm-it seems likely that the Washington
court could recognize a duty to warn. Notwithstanding the court's ultimate con-
clusion, the Hawkins case sets forth the rationale for concluding that the attorney-
client relationship is a special relationship and that, in fact, an attorney may be
held accountable for a failure to warn of such violence, even if the information is
obtained in the course of the attorney-client relationship.
There are only a few cases in Maine which address the general issue of a duty
of care to a third party. Two cases of particular significance, Joy v. Eastern Maine
Medical Center70 and Flanders v. Cooper,7 1 consider whether a medical profes-
sional has a duty to third parties.
In Joy v. Eastern Maine Medical Center, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
sitting as the Law Court held that the trial court erred in ruling that, as a matter of
law, a physician does not have a duty of care to a third party.7 2 In Joy, the plaintiff
was driving his motorcycle when he was involved in a collision with another driver
who was returning from the emergency room where he had been treated for an eye
abrasion and had been given an eye patch.73 The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that
Eastern Maine Medical Center and an emergency room physician were negligent
in failing to warn the patient not to drive with the eye patch. 74 The trial court
65. See id. at 365-66.
66. Id. at 365.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 529 A.2d 1364 (Me. 1987).
71. 1998 ME 28, 706 A.2d 589.
72. See Joy v. Eastern Maine Med. Ctr., 529 A.2d at 1366.
73. See id. at 1364-65.
74. See id. at 1365.
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granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment implicitly finding that, even
if the hospital and physician may have had a duty to warn the patient, that duty of
care did not extend to a person that was injured by the patient.7 5 The Law Court
rejected this "rigid conception of duty" 76 and found that plaintiff had stated a claim
for relief on the theory that a physician has a duty to third parties (the general
driving public) as well as to the patient to warn the patient of his or her limited
abilities to drive.77
In Flanders v. Cooper, the Law Court addressed the issue of "whether a health
care professional whose negligent treatment of a patient induced false memories
of sexual abuse by a third party owed a duty of care to that injured party."7 8 In
declining to recognize such a duty, the court first noted that factors other than
foreseeability influence the recognition of a duty of care.7 9 The Law Court went
on to distinguish Joy, noting that there was no claim in Joy that the treatment for
the eye abrasion was negligent. Rather, in Joy, the court was concerned with the
doctor's negligence in failing to warn the patient of his limited vision as a result of
the eye patch. 80 The court also distinguished Tarasoffv. Regents of University of
California noting that there too, the duty to warn did not implicate medical judg-
ments as to the appropriate care of the patient.8 1 Unlike those cases, the court
concluded that "the duty that Flanders advocates is a duty of medical treatment
that goes to the core of the relationship between a patient and a health care profes-
sional." 82 To recognize such a duty would, in the view of the court, restrict treat-
ment choices and intrude directly on the professional relationship.83
Although the court was concerned that the imposition of a duty of care to the
third party would be a severe intrusion on the professional-patient relationship, it
was also concerned that the "recognition of the duty urged by Flanders would
undermine laws enacted by the Legislature to enhance efforts to uncover and to
investigate possible instances of child abuse." 84 The court did not want the impo-
sition of a duty of care to the alleged abuser to serve as a disincentive to the detec-
tion and treatment of abuse.85
Flanders could be read broadly to suggest that the court would hesitate to
impose a duty of care on a third party when that duty would interfere with a profes-
sional-client relationship. As with the medical profession, there are parallel con-
cerns in the legal profession that imposing a duty of care would impermissibly
interfere with the attorney-client relationship. However, the court's rejection of a
duty of care was driven in part by its overriding concern with protecting children.
If the court were confronted with a situation where an attorney's failure to act
allowed a child to suffer great harm, it might conclude that a duty of care should be
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1366.
78. Flanders v. Cooper, 1998 ME 28, 3, 706 A.2d 589, 590.
79. See id. 4, 706 A.2d at 590.
80. See id. 1 5-6,706 A.2d at 590.
81. See id. 7, 706 A.2d at 590-91.
82. d 8, 706 A.2d at 591.
83. See id.
84. Id 9, 706 A.2d at 591.
85. See.id at 10, 706 A.2d at 591-92.
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imposed in light of the overwhelming number of abused children, as well as the
extent of the damages inflicted on these children. In addition, on other occasions
the court has been clear that whether a duty of care exists "necessarily involves
considerations beyond the factual determination that a particular injury was a fore-
seeable consequence of some particular condpct... [and] is in turn dependant on
recognizing and weighing relevant policy implications."8 6 Given the court's will-
ingness to evaluate the existence of a duty of care with an eye towards policy, as
well as its limited recognition that there can be a duty of care to a third party, the
court could conclude that a duty of care exists between an attorney and third par-
ties at risk as a result of the client's potential violent conduct.
With regard to the specific issue of potential civil liability for an attorney who
fails to warn of her client's child abuse, there is no clear guidance. It does appear,
however, that the imposition of civil liability remains a possibility for an attorney
who does not warn authorities about the abuse of a child.
m. THE CONFIDENIALITY RULES
Under the scenario facing attorney Adams, even if he were not concerned that
a failure to warn of abuse could expose him to tort liability, Adams might feel a
moral obligation to disclose the abuse. When the information of the abuse is gained
in the course of Adams's legal representation of Brown, Adams would need to
carefully consider his ethical obligations under the professional rules of conduct in
deciding whether disclosure would be permissible. This section is devoted to an
analysis of the impact of ethical rules on an attorney's ability to make a report of
child abuse.
Historically, an overriding concern of the legal profession has been that com-
munications between an attorney and client be held confidential. Without such
confidentiality, it is argued, the attorney-client relationship would be irreparably
undermined. This concern with confidentiality is reflected in both substantive
areas of the law (evidentiary rules), as well as the ethical rules attorneys must
comport with in order to remain licensed members of the profession. The eviden-
tiary rules are narrow-they can serve to protect the client from having informa-
tion pertaining to the client's representation disclosed in the courtroom. 87 The
ethical rules, by contrast, are much more expansive and require that the attorney
keep information obtained during the course of representation confidential, sub-
ject to a few limited exceptions.
A. Evidentiary Attorney-Client Privilege
Maine Rule of Evidence 502 provides: "[a] client has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communica-
tions made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal ser-
vices to the client . .- 88 The privilege is an evidentiary rule-in other words,
86. See id., 14, 706 A.2d at 590 (quoting Cameron v. Pepin, 610 A.2d 279, 282 (Me. 1992)).
87. For a general discussion of the relationship between the attorney-client evidentiary privi-
lege and the duty of confidentiality, see GEoFFny C. HAZARD, JR. AND WILLIAM HODES, Tus LAW
OF LAWYERING §1.6:103 (Supp. 1996).
88. ME. R. Evi. 502(b). The privilege historically belonged to both the attorney and the
client. Today, however, the privilege lies exclusively with the client. If the client waives the
privilege, the attorney may not assert it and the attorney must testify to the communications. See
Stuart, supra note 4, at 251.
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communications protected by the privilege cannot be compelled in court.89 Spe-
cifically, the rule protects against the in-court disclosure of communications made
in confidence by a client to the lawyer, so long as the communications pertain to
the subject of legal representation.9 0 Therefore, for example, if an attorney who
was representing a wife in a custody dispute learned from the wife that she had
abused her children, the client could invoke the privilege and keep the attorney
from being compelled to present in-court testimony about that information. The
only exception to this rule would be if the wife actually sought advice or assistance
from the attorney on how to commit the crime itself. This is termed the crime-
fraud exception and it is recognized in every state. 9 1 The exception applies to both
communications concerning future crimes and fraud as well as wrongful acts al-
ready in progress.92
Because the evidentiary rules of privilege only address the in-court compul-
sion of testimony, the evidentiary rules have no bearing on disclosure of abuse to
civil authorities. Therefore, whether an attorney in Maine can disclose informa-
tion pertaining to a client's abuse of a child to civil authorities is not affected by
evidentiary rules even when the knowledge of abuse was gained in the course of
89. Two justifications for the attorney-client privilege are asserted: utilitarian and humanis-
tic. The utilitarian justification assumes that clients need fully informed legal advice in order to
be fully protected. By protecting communications from disclosure, clients are encouraged to
reveal all relevant information and, therefore attorneys, once they know all critical information,
are in the best position to offer legal advice and legal representation. It is also an underlying
assumption that, given the comfort and trust between lawyer and client as a result of the privi-
lege, clients will seek legal advice about questionable conduct. The lawyer will then be able to
counsel the client to seek resolution within the confines of permissible, legal conduct, thus dis-
couraging the client from illegal conduct.
The humanistic or rights-based approach concerns the client's privacy, autonomy, and dig-
nity, giving recognition to both the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal cases. The reasoning is
that "fain accused should not be convicted on the basis of a forced disclosure of the client's
privileged communications to his lawyer. Forcing the accused's lawyer to testify concerning
those communications would be an indirect way of requiring the accused to testify against him-
self, and would deny him effective assistance of counsel.' Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical
Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RutrcEs L
REv. 81, 86; see also To Disclose or Not to Disclose: The Dilemma of the School Counselor, 13
Miss. C. L. REv. 323,324 (1993); Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy
and Its Exceptions: Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MtNN. L REv. 63, 102-04 (1998).
90. See WIGMoRE EviDE cF § 2310 (Supp. 1991). Levin, supra note 89 at 84; Cramton &
Knowles, supra note 89 at 102. But see Robert P. Mosteller, ChildAbuse Reporting Lavs and
Attorney- Client Confidence: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DuKe LAw
J. 203, 225-235 (1992) (arguing that the attorney-client privilege should apply to out-of-court
disclosure requirements).
91. See Cramton & Knowles, supra note 89, at 103. See, e.g., Purcell v. District Attorney for
Suffolk County, 676 N.E. 2d 436 (Mass. 1997). In Purcell, the client informed the attorney that
he intended to burn down a building where he had recently been fired as a maintenance man.
See id at 437-38. The attorney called the authorities, who found arson materials and charged
the client with attempted arson. See id. at 438. The attorney was then subpoenaed to testify at
trial about what his client had told him about the arson. See icL The attorney refused to testify
on the basis of the attorney-client privilege. See id Because the court concluded that the client's
statements were made in the course of obtaining legal advice, rather than obtaining assistance in
committing a crime, the communications were protected by the privilege. See id at 440-41.
92. See Levin, supra 89, at 86-87.
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legal representation and pertained to the subject of representation. Rules of pro-
fessional conduct, on the other hand, speak directly to this issue and govern an
attorney's ability to make a report of a client's abuse of a child based on otherwise
confidential information.
B. Model Code and Model Rules
The rules of professional conduct provide that information gained by an attor-
ney in the course of representation must be kept confidential and may not be re-
vealed in any forum, subject to limited exceptions. Although justifications for the
rule of confidentiality abound, the principle rationale is that "[T]he observance of
the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the
client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper repre-
sentation of the client but also encourages people to seek early legal assistance."'93
The ethical rules relating to the confidentiality of client communications have
been promulgated in three model codes issued by the American Bar Association:
the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908, the Model Code in 1969, and the Model
Rules in 1983. The codes serve as recommendations to guide each state in its
adoption of a code of professional conduct. 94
The Model Code of 1969 contained a general prohibition on disclosure of
client's confidences or secrets. 95 Under the Code, a confidence referred to infor-
mation protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law.96 Secrets
referred to other information gained in course of the professional relationship.9 7
Secrets were considered to be either information that the client requested be kept
confidential or information that would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client
if it were revealed. 98 In an exception to the general mandate of confidentiality, the
Code provided that "[a] lawyer may reveal the intention of his client to commit a
crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."99 The Model Code
further permitted an attorney to reveal otherwise confidential information if re-
quired by a court or by law.1 00
93. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.6 cmt 2 (1997).
94. Each state has its own code of professional conduct; some states are modeled after the
Model Code while others find guidance in the Rules. These are binding rules that govern the
practice of law-an attorney who falls to comply with the rules risks punishment ranging from
reprimand to the revocation of her professional license.
The Maine Bar Rules provide in relevant part:
Rule 1. Scope of Rules.
(a) Jurisdiction. These rules govern the practice of law by attorneys within this
State and the conduct of attorneys with respect to their professional activities and as
officers of the Court....
Rule 3.1 Scope and Effect
(a) This Code shall be binding upon attorneys as provided in Rule l(a). Violation
of these rules shall be deemed to constitute conduct 'unworthy of an attorney' for
purposes of 4 M.R.S.A. § 851 and Rule 7(e)(6)(A)....
ME. BAR. R. l(a), 3.1 (a).
95. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, DR 4-101(B) (1969).
96. See id. at DR 4-101(A).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. Id. at DR 4-101(C)(3).
100. See id. at DR 4-101(C)(2).
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When the Model Code was replaced by the Model Rules, the section relating
to client confidences was notably altered. In its final form, a strict approach to
disclosure was adopted-Rule 1.6 permitted disclosure of confidential informa-
tion only when necessary to prevent a crime that would result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm.10 1 "A lawyer may reveal [confidential] information to
the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: To prevent the client
from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in immi-
nent death or substantial bodily harm." 102
The adoption of Rule 1.6 was a striking departure from the Model Code. Under
the Model Code, there was no restriction on the type of crime that permitted dis-
closure. The Model Rules narrowed the categories; only confidential information
pertaining to a crime that could cause imminent death or substantial bodily harm
could be revealed. Moreover, the Rules introduced the element of "reasonable
belief' to the analysis. 103
C. Maine's Ethical Rules
The Maine Code of Professional Responsibility is based on the Model Code,
although there are important variations. With regard to the confidentiality provi-
sions, the Maine Code is unique. Rule 3.6(h) states, "except as permitted by these
rules or as required by law or by order of court, a lawyer shall not, without the
informed written consent of the client, knowingly reveal a confidence or secret of
the client; [or] use such confidence or secret to the disadvantage of the client....:104
Confidences and secrets, as in the Model Code, include privileged information and
information specifically requested to be held in confidence: "As used herein 'con-
fidence' refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under ap-
plicable law, and 'secret' refers to other information gained in the professional
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client." 105 Unless there is an inde-
pendent legal requirement or the attorney is ordered by the court, the attorney must
not disclose confidential information. 106
101. See HAzARD Am HODES, supra note 87, § 1.6:302.
102. MODEL Ru.E O PRoFFrssioA. Co'DOucr, 1.6(b)(1) (1998).
103. Model Rule 1.6 has generated significant debate. See RAY. Nahstoll, The Lanyer's
Allegiance: Priorities Regarding Confidentiality, 41 %VAsH & Lz. L REv. 421 (1984); Albert
Alschiler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value Among Many ora Categorical
Imperative?, 52 U. CoLo. L. REv. 349 (1980); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth Contin-
ued: More Disclosure, Less Privilege, 54 U. CoLO. L. Rav. 51 (1982). Much of the commentary
has been negative. Such sentiment is reflected by the authors of the Law of Lahyering: "al-
though Rule 1.6 as finally adopted reflects the laudable desire to minimize exceptions to confi-
dentiality, it goes too far. Many lawyers will chafe under a rule that threatens to punish them if
they do what is morally right. The public, when it understands these implications, will not
praise the profession for granting maximum protection to clients, but will condemn the profes-
sion for imperiously decreeing that its 'ethics' supersede prevailing notions of morality." HAZ-
ARD AND HoDEs, supra note 87, at § 1.6:302.
104. M. BAR. R. 3.6(h)(1).
105. 1&. R. 3.6(h)(5).
106. The section "as required by law" immediately removes a lawyer from the obligations of
Rule 3.6. For example, if there were a legislative duty to report child abuse, Rule 3.6 would not
apply because there would be an independent legal requirement.
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Rule 3.6(h)(4) provides the exception to the general duty of confidentiality.
Rule 3.6(h)(4) states "this provision is not violated by the disclosure of a client's
intention to commit a crime or the information necessary to prevent the crime or to
avoid subjecting others to risk of harm." 107 The intention of this exception is
consistent with the Model Code and the Model Rules; lawyers must not be prohib-
ited from preventing future crimes. The exception, however, is considerably broader
than the exception in both the Model Code and the Model Rules, and has signifi-
cant implications on whether an attorney can report her client's abuse of a child.
According to the language of the rule, if an attorney knows that his or her
client intends to abuse a child in the future (i.e., the client tells the attorney that he
or she is going to abuse his or her child that evening), the attorney may reveal the
otherwise confidential information. 10 8 Child abuse is a crime, and a lawyer does
not violate ethical obligations by the disclosure of a client's intent to commit a
crime or the information necessary to prevent the crime. 109
Moreover, the rule allows for disclosure of information that would avoid sub-
jecting others to a risk of harm. Thus, the intended abuse need not rise to the level
of a crime for the attorney to have the discretion to disclose information. There-
fore, as to future conduct, no ethical problem is presented under Maine Bar Rule
3.6; the facts fall squarely within the future crime exception and an attorney may
disclose otherwise confidential information.
The next and more difficult, albeit likely, question is whether an attorney, who
knows his or her client has abused a child in the past and believes that the client
will continue to commit such abuse, may report the abuse when it is based on
otherwise confidential information. Under the ethical rules, if a client reveals that
he or she robbed a bank three years ago, this information could not be revealed
since it does not reveal an intention to commit a future crime or future harm. How-
ever, in the case of child abuse, do past instances of abuse constitute an appropriate
basis for disclosure? Because child abuse is best understood as a continuing crime,
under Maine's Rule 3.6, an attorney should be able to report abuse without violat-
ing his or her ethical obligations even when the information pertains to past in-
stances of abuse.
Generally, as discussed previously, the rules of confidentiality are read to pre-
clude attorneys from revealing past misconduct without client permission. How-
ever, the nature of the crime is such that past conduct is an indicator of future
behavior. If a lawyer knows of past instances of abuse, this information implicates
the present and the future as well; the crime is inherently ongoing. "[O]ne of the
distinguishing characteristics of the battered child syndrome is that the assault on
the victim is not an isolated, atypical event but part of an environmental mosaic of
repeated beatings and abuse that will not only continue but will become more se-
vere unless there is appropriate medicolegal intervention."' 110 Therefore, in the
case of child abuse, it is appropriate to view past instances of abuse as indicating a
continuing course of conduct. Under this reasoning, disclosure of information
107. ME. BAR. R. 3.6(h)(4).
108. Unlike other states, like Wisconsin where the ethical rules impose a mandatory duty to
disclose (shall), Maine Rule 3.6 appears to be permissive.
109. ME. BAR. R. 3.6(h)(4).
110. See Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389, 395 (Cal. 1976) (emphasis added).
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regarding past abuse would not be precluded by confidentiality rules because child
abuse is a continuing crime that implicates the future-specifically, the client's
future intentions to commit a crime.
The text of Maine's Rule supports this conclusion. As noted, the rule first
allows for disclosure as to "intent" to commit a crime-clearly a forward looking
rule. This language would not encompass past perpetrations of a crime. The rule
goes on to state, however, that information necessary to prevent a crime or to avoid
subjecting others to risk of harm may also be disclosed.11 1 Where evidence of a
past crime demonstrates a future risk of harm, the rule would appear to permit
disclosure. Therefore, in the case of child abuse, where the past informs the future,
the disclosure of past instances of abuse could protect the child from future risk of
harm and should be permissible under the rules.
This conclusion is consistent with the ethics committees of other states that
have considered the question of whether an attorney may disclose otherwise confi-
dential information to make a report of child abuse. 112 Six ethics panels consider
such reporting to be consistent with the attorney's ethical obligations.1 13
In a 1992 North Carolina opinion, the State Bar stated that an attorney may
disclose confidential information to report suspected past and potentially continu-
ous child abuse. The panel stated that "[i]f the lawyer believes that the clients
intend to continue the abuse, disclosure would be authorized, in the lawyer's dis-
cretion, under the exception to the confidentiality rule regarding a client's inten-
tion to commit a crime." 114 The ethics panel did not discuss what level of knowl-
edge or certainty would be required for an attorney to report child abuse. Rather,
the panel seemed to leave such decisions to the discretion or conscience of the
attorney.115
Not surprisingly, North Carolina's ethical rules are based on the more permis-
sive Model Code. The confidentiality exceptions to the North Carolina Ethics
Rules permit disclosure of confidential information when the client is likely to
commit a crime. The more generous exceptions of the Model Code give ethics
committees and the licensed Bar greater flexibility in deciding whether to make a
report free from-potential ethical violations.
111. See id.
112. The state ethical rules, which govern confidentiality and disclosure, vary between the
disclosure necessary to prevent a crime to the more substantial requirement of disclosure only
when necessary to prevent death or serious bodily harm. Child abuse falls under either rule,
however. It would be irresponsible to argue that child abuse does not have the ability to threaten
serious bodily harm or even death:
The limitation to serious future crimes probably has little necessary impact in the
child abuse area with respect to substantial instances of abuse. Courts or ethics pan-
els can, without distorting the words beyond their reasonable meaning, define the
impact of abuse, whether involving physical trauma or sexual exploitation with its
accompanying psychological damage, as constituting serious injury to these particu-
larly vulnerable victims.
Mosteller, supra note 90, at 278.
113. See Indianapolis Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1-1986 (1986); Md. State Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 83-60 (1983); Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. No.
90-2 (1990); NJ. Advisory Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. No. 280 (Supp. 1974); N.C. State Bar
Ethics Comm., Op. RPC 120 (1992); and WVis. State Bar Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. E-88-1 1.
114. N.C. State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 120 (1992).
115. See id
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In an early decision, New Jersey issued an ethics opinion ruling that the
attorney's duty of confidentiality does not apply to the continuing crime of child
abuse when the facts demonstrate a propensity to continue the crime. 116 Interest-
ingly, New Jersey's ethical rule governing confidentiality is based on the more
restrictive Model Rules and only permits disclosure of information when the attor-
ney reasonably believes it "necessary to prevent the client from committing a crimi-
nal act.., that is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm. '1 17 The New
Jersey ethics committee's decision demonstrates that even the narrow exceptions
to the general rule of confidentiality still permit the disclosure of past instances of
abuse without violation of ethical rules.
Similarly, in Wisconsin, the ethics committee held that the lawyer must report
information regarding child abuse with or without client consent, so as to prevent
a crime when the lawyer reasonably believes that the abuse will continue.118 As in
New Jersey, Wisconsin has a modified version of the Model Rule 1.6 which pro-
vides that a lawyer "shall reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reason-
ably believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudu-
lent act.., likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm... ."119 However,
unlike the New Jersey rule, the Wisconsin rule is mandatory; the attorney must
reveal the information.
When presented with the question of whether an attorney may reveal past
instances of child abuse, the ethics committees seem to take a permissive approach.
Regardless of the confidentiality rules in place, whether they are based on the
Model Code or the Model Rules, the committees recognize child abuse is a unique
crime; the crime is not limited to specific instances of conduct. The committees
apparently permit disclosure of otherwise confidential information when past and
future conduct are fundamentally intertwined. 12 0
Academic treatment of this issue also seems to recognize that the ethical rules
for attorneys must allow the discretion to report. In The Law of Lawyering child
abuse serves as an example of a "future or continuing" crime.12 1 The authors
borrowed a hypothetical case presented to the Massachusetts Bar Association Eth-
ics Committee to consider where disclosure was permissible. 122 In the case pre-
sented, the lawyer formerly represented a client who pled guilty to charges of child
molestation and served a sentence of probation. The lawyer learned that the former
client was working at a camp for troubled and abused children. The lawyer que-
116. See N.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 280 (Supp. 1974).
117. N.J. RuiS OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr 1.6(b)(1) (1992).
118. See Wis. State Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. E-88- 11.
119. Wis. Sup. CT. R. 20:1.6(b).
120. Continuing crimes have been included in the "future crime exception" to the confiden-
tiality rules. See HAZARD AND HODES, supra note 87, at § 1.6: 303-1. In one such example, the
New York City Bar Association Ethics Committee was asked to consider whether an attorney,
who discovered his client had become a fugitive and had learned where the client was hiding,
must reveal his client's whereabouts. The committee avoided the decision of whether flight was
a crime but did state that, "if it is a crime, then the client has disclosed to the attorney the
commission of a crime and has implicitly expressed an intention to continue committing the
crime." Committee on Professional & Judicial Ethics of Association of Bar of City of New
York, Op. No. 81-13 (1981). In such case, a lawyer may reveal a future or continuing crime.
121. See HAZARD AND HODES, supra note 87, at § 1.6:303-1.
122. See Mass. Bar Assoc. Ethics Comm., Op. 90-2 (1990).
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ried the ethics committee whether he could reveal that information to the camp. 123
Agreeing with the Massachusetts Ethics Panel's conclusion, the authors indicated
that where a lawyer knows of past instances of abuse and thought it "reasonably
likely" that further offenses of abuse would be committed, the lawyer should have
the discretion to disclose the information. 12
4
In reviewing the scope of the future harm exception to confidentiality rules,
the RESTATEmENT ON THE LAW oF LAWYER1NG suggests that "these Sections do not
apply to a past act of a client, no matter how clearly illegal and serious, if the
consequences of the act have already occurred." 125 This statement, however, does
not deny the attorney the right to disclose known past incidents of abuse. In the
case of child abuse, past acts of abuse have grave present and future consequences
for the child and society. As the Restatement makes clear, "[A] lawyer may take
preventative measures under this Section even though some act has already oc-
curred if the consequences of the act have not yet been inflicted on the victim." 12 6
In the case of child abuse, the consequences extend far from a single incident of
violence. Disclosure is therefore consistent with the Restatement.
D. Reasonable Belief
Assuming that disclosure is ethical and that the attorney is the only person
who knows of the abuse, how is an attorney to decide what constitutes a sufficient
indication that past abuse is a predicate for future abuse; what standard of proof is
required to disclose? In other words, how sure does an attorney need to be that a
child has been abused by her client? Maine Bar Rule 3.6(h)(4) does not define the
level of cognition necessary to trigger the rule's application and permit disclo-
sure.127 It simply states, "this provision is not violated by the disclosure of the
client's intention to commit a crime... .',12 8 As noted previously, the language of
Model Rules suggests that confidences may be revealed according to a standard of
"reasonable belief."12 9 The Model Rules define "belief or believes" to be "that
the person involved actually supposed the facts in question to be true. A person's
belief may be inferred from the circumstances."' 130 "'Reasonable belief' ... when
used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in ques-
tion and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable." 13 1 Taking a
123. See id.
124. See HAzA Am HODES, supra note 87, at § 1.6:303-1 ("(It] is imperative that a lawyer.
have discretion to disclose, so that he can quietly use the threat of disclosure to arrange for the
former client to remove himself from the camp.").
125. RESTATmENT OF m LAw: THE LAw GOVERNNG LAWYERS § 117-A (Tentative Draft No. 3,
1990) (emphasis added).
126. Id (emphasis added).
127. ME. BAR. R. 3.6(h)(4),
128. See id
129. "A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act... MoDEL RUaEs oF PRoFEs-
SOiNAL CoNDUcr 1.6(b) (1998). Even though the reasonable belief modifies the necessity of
disclosure, it indicates discretion on the part of the attorney and therefore can be read to apply to
the less restrictive 'reasonable belier standard to level of knowledge.
130. MODEL RuLEs OF PROmSSIONAL CoNDuct 9 (1997).
131. Id.
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conservative approach, if a standard of reasonable belief were read into Maine
Rule 3.6(h)(4), an attorney may report the information where she infers from the
circumstances that her client is abusing a child, even though the attorney does not
have firm factual evidence. This standard seems an appropriate balance between
the requiring undisputable evidence prior to disclosure and a recognition that an
attorney will rarely be given definitive evidence on this issue.
There is no doubt that many lawyers find these subjective and inferential stan-
dards discomforting. 132 Attorneys are trained to disbelieve, to question the truth.
This is no excuse, however, for suspended belief in the case of preventing future
harm. As the authors of The Law of Lawyering stated:
[A]Ithough his professional role may require a lawyer to take a detached attitude
of unbelief, the law of lawyering does not permit a lawyer to escape all account-
ability by suspending as well his intelligence and common sense. .. all authori-
ties agree--even those who take the most unqualified positions on the duty of a
lawyer zealously to serve his clients-that there comes a point where only brute
rationalization, moral irresponsibility, and pure sophistry can support the conten-
tion that the lawyer does not "know" what the situation is.133
IV. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMrs TO COMBAT CHILD ABUSE
Thus far, this Article has argued that attorney Adams has the discretion to
make a report of child abuse to civil authorities without running afoul of his ethical
obligations. Given the nature of child abuse, disclosure of otherwise confidential
information is permissible under the rules of professional conduct, and although
such disclosure would interfere with the attorney-client relationship, the interfer-
ence is justifiable on the theory that attorneys must have the ability to reveal infor-
mation which subjects others to risk of harm. Some state legislatures, however,
have begun to include attorneys in lists of professionals who are subject to a man-
datory duty to report child abuse. The trend to adopt a legislatively mandated duty
to report, which would deny an attorney any discretion not to report abuse, would
significantly and detrimentally alter the attorney-client relationship. It might also
have the effect of thwarting the very goal of such legislation; namely, the protec-
tion of children.
A. The ChildAbuse Reporting Laws
In recognition of the pernicious effects of child abuse, and with the goal of
increasing protection for children subject to abuse, every state in the nation has
some form of statutory reporting requirements. 134 The statutes mandate that cer-
132. HAZARD AND HODES, supra note 87, at § 403 (Professional Unbelief versus Personal
Knowledge).
133. Id.
134. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-1 (1998); ALAsKA STAT. § 47.17.020(b) (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 13-3620(c) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-507 (Michie 1999);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); COLO. Rv. STAT. ANN. 19-3-304 (1999 &
Supp. 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-103 (West 1992 & 1999 Supp.); DEL CODE ANN. tit.
16 § 903 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.201 (West Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (1992 &
Supp. 1998); HAW. REv. STAT. § 350-1.3 (1998); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619 (1998); ILL. COMp. STAT.
325 § 5/4 (1993 & Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-1 (West 1998); IowA CODE ANN. §
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tain professionals, typically professionals who have some contact with children,
are required to report suspected or known cases of child abuse to either civil or
criminal authorities. Originally the statutes were limited to the medical profession
and only required the reporting of serious physical injuries or non-accidental inju-
ries. 135 Over time, the statutes have come to include a greater variety of persons
who have contact with children. Similarly, the types of conditions that must be
reported have grown to include physical neglect, sexual abuse, and emotional mal-
treatment. 136 Currently, there seems to be a trend to impose a duty on "all per-
sons" or "anyone" who suspects child abuse. 137 To encourage reporting, all states
grant immunity from civil or criminal liability for those who make a report as long
as the report was made in good faith. 13 8
232.69; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522 (1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (Banks-Baldwin
1998); LA. CODE ANN. art. 603, 609 (1995); ME. Rsv. STAT. ANN., tit. 22 § 4011 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1998); MD. CODEANN., FAi. LAw § 5-705 (1998); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 119, § SA
(1994 & Supp. 1999); MicH. Co'. LAws ANN. 722.624 (West 1995 & Supp. 1998); Meet. STAT.
§ 626.556 (1983 & Supp. 1998); Miss. CODEANN. § 43-21-353 (1993 & Supp. 1998); Mo. Rnv.
STAr. § 210.115 (1996 & Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE. ANN. 41-3-201 (1997); NEB. REv. ST. § 28-
711 (1998); NET. Rnv. STAT. § 432B.220(2)(i) (1998); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (1998);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN., § 32a-4-3 (Michie 1998); NY Soc.
SEiv. LAw § 414 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301 (1999); N.D. CE,-r.
CODE, § 50- 25.1-03 (1989 & Supp. 1997); OHfo Rnv. CODEANN. § 2151.421(A)(1) (West 1998);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7103 (1998 & Supp. 1998); OR. REv. STAT. § 419B.010 (1998); 23 PA. CONS.
STAr. ANN. § 6312 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. Lws § 40-11-3 (1998); S.C. CoDE ANN.
§ 20-7-510 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1996); S.D. CoDIED Laws § 26-8A-3 (Michie 1992 &
Supp. 1998); TENN. CODEANN. § 37-1-403 (1998); Tax. F,?. CoDBANN. § 261.101 (West 1996
& Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 (1991 &
Supp. 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.4 (1995 & Supp. 1998); WAsH. Rnv. CODE § 26.44.030
(1997 & Supp. 1999); W. VA. CODE § 49- 6A-2 (1998); Wis. STAT. § 48.981 (1997 & Supp.
1998); Wyo STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (1998).
135. See Rosencrantz, supra note 23, at 339.
136. See id. at 340.
137. For example, in Kentucky the statute reads: "Duty to Report Dependency, Neglect or
Abuse (1) Any person who knows or has reasonable cause to believe that a child is dependent,
neglected or abused shall immediately cause an oral or written report to be made..." Ky. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (Baldwin 1996) (emphasis added). Oklahoma's statute begins by specifi-
cally including certain medical professionals and teachers of children under 18 and then in sub-
section (d) states "every other person having reason to believe that a child under the age of 18
years has had physical injuries ... shall report the matter promptly." Oa.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 10. §
7103 (West 1996) (emphasis added). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (1998); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 39.201 (West Supp. 1998); IowA CODE § 16-1619 (1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-1
(West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., FANi. Lw § 5-705 (1998); NB. R-v. ST. § 28-711 (1998); N.H.
Rv. STrT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (1998); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
32A.4-3 (Michie 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301 (1999); OR. Ray. STAT. § 419B.010 (1998);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 40-11-3 (1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (1998); Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. §
261.101 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a.403 (1998); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §
14-3-205 (1998).
138. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-9 (1998); ALAsKA STAT. § 47.17.050 (1998); Amz. Ray. STAT. §
13-3620(g) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998); AmK. CODEANN. § 12-12-517 (Michie 1999); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 11172 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-309 (1999); Co',.. GEN.
STAr. ANN. § 17a-10le (Vest 1992); Da. CoDE ANN. tit. 16, § 908 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
39.203 (Vest Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (1998); HAw. REv. STAT. § 350-3 (1998);
IDAHO CODE § 16-1620 (1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1526 (1998); Ky. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 620.050
(Banks-Baldwin 1998); LA. CODEANN art. 611 (1995); ME. Ray. STAT.ANN. tit. 22, § 4014 (West
1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAN. LAw § 5-708 (1998); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119 § 5IA (1994 &
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The same professionals for whom reporting is mandatory are often also the
beneficiaries of a statutory privilege to keep their client's confidences and secrets
confidential. 139 To address this apparent conflict, all states, except New Jersey,
have statutorily waived certain privileged communications for cases of reporting
child abuse. 140 These abrogation provisions typically include physician-patient,
psychotherapist-client, clergyman-penitent, and husband-wife privileges and al-
low for the reporting of child abuse. 141
Statutes in twenty-one states subject attorneys to a statutory duty to report
known or suspected child abuse. Three of these states-Mississippi, Nevada, and
Ohio-have statutes which explicitly include attorneys among the groups subject
to reporting requirements. 142 However, the Ohio statute goes on to exempt attor-
neys from the reporting requirement if the information is received in the attorney-
client relationship. 143 Similarly, in Nevada, attorneys are mandatory reporters
unless the attorney "has acquired the knowledge of abuse or neglect from a client
who is or may be accused of the abuse and neglect." 144 Given these caveats,
attorneys are not mandatory reporters when it comes to their clients. Mississippi,
on the other hand, seems to require reporting no matter what the circumstance. 145
The exact intent of the Legislature, however, is unclear. All the statute provides is
that "the reporting of an abused or neglected chid shall not constitute a breach of
confidentiality." 146 Although this language seems to indicate an intent to require
attorneys to report regardless of where the information came from, the language is
ambiguous.
The other eighteen states that include attorneys as mandatory reporters do so
through language that imposes a duty on "any person" or "any person, including
but not limited to" or "any other person." 14 7 Of these states, treatment of confi-
Supp. 1999); MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.625 (West 1995 & Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. § 626.556
(1983 & Supp. 1998); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-21- 355 (1993 & Supp. 1998); Mo. Rsv. STAT. §
210.135 (1996 & 1999); MONT. CODEANN. § 41-3-203 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-716 (1998);
NEV. REv. STAT. § 4332B/160 (1998); N.H. REv. STAT.ANN. § 169-C:31 (1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
9:6-8.13 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN., § 32A-4-5 (Michie 1998); NY Soc. SEv. LAW § 419
(McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-309 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 50-
25.1-09 (1989 & Supp. 1997); OIo REv. CODEANN. § 2151.421(0)(1) (West 1998); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 10, § 7105 (1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.025 (1998); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6318 (West
1991 & Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-4 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. 23 § 20-7- 540 (Law.
Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-14 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1998);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-410 (1998); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.106 (West 1996); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 62A-4a-410 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 (1992 & Supp. 1998); WASH. REv.
CODE § 26.44.060 (1997 & Supp. 1999); W.VA. CODE § 49-6A-6 (1998); Wis. STAT. § 48.981
(1997 & Supp. 1998); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-209 (1998).
139. Stuart, supra note 4, at 247.
140. See Mosteller, supra note 90 at 216-218. See generally for a discussion of the interac-
tion between states' reporting requirements and the attorney-client privilege.
141. See id.
142. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (1993 & Supp. 1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
432B.220(2)(i) (Michie 1998); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.421(A)(1) (West 1998).
143. See OHIO Rev. CODEANN. § 2151.421(A)(2) (West 1998).
144. NEV. REv. STAT. § 432B.220(2)(i) (1998).
145. Id.
146. MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-23-9 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
147. See supra note 137.
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dentiality varies, ranging from explicit statements that exempt attorneys from re-
porting when the information is gained in a professional relationship 14 8 to state-
ment which indicate that confidentiality provisions will not exempt attorneys from
reporting. 149
B. Maine's Reporting Requirements
In Maine, child abuse reporting requirements are governed by 22 M.R.S.A. §
4011. Maine does not impose a generalized duty on "all persons" or "anyone" to
report known or suspected child abuse. Any person, however, nmay make a report
if "that person knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been or is
likely to be abused or neglected." 15 0 There is a broad range of professionals,
however, who, when acting in their professional capacity, must report kno,m or
suspected abuse or neglect. 15 1 The information is to be reported to the Depart-
ment of Human Services or the administrator of the institution, agency, or facility
immediately.15 2 If any person, required by law to report, knows or has reasonable
cause to suspect child abuse by a person other than the child's caretaker, a report
must be made to the District Attorney.153 As the mandatory reporting law con-
flicts with some preexisting privileged communications, section 4015 abrogates
the husband-wife, physician and psychotherapist-patient privileges that are set forth
in the Maine Rules of Evidence and by statute. 154 Accordingly, the privilege to
148. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 419B.010 (1998); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (Michie 1998);
MD. CODE ANN., Fmi. LAW § 5-705(a)(1) (1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-310 (1999).
149. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 32A-4-5 (Michie 1998); OrI.A. STAT. tit. 10, §
7103(A)(3) (1998 & Supp. 1998).
150. M_. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4011(1)(B) (,Vest 1995 & Supp. 1999).
151. See id. §4011:
(1) Persons mandated to report suspected abuse or neglect. 1. Reasonable cause to
suspect. When, while acting in a professional capacity, an adult who is a medical or
osteopathic physician, resident, intern, emergency medical services person, medical
examiner, physician's assistant, dentist, dental hygienist, dental assistant, chiroprac-
tor, podiatrist, registered or licensed practical nurse, teacher, guidance counselor, school
official, social worker, court appointed special advocate or guardian ad litem for the
child, homemaker, home health aide, medical or social service worker, psychologist,
child care personnel, mental health professional, law enforcement official, state fire
inspector or chair of a professional licensing board that has jurisdiction over man-
dated reporter knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been or is
likely to be abused or neglected, that person shall immediately report or cause a re-
port to be made to the [Department of Human Services].
Id
152. Id. A report of known or suspected child abuse must be made immediately by telephone
to the department. If requested by the department, a written report should be submitted within
forty-eight hours. See id. § 4012(1). Section 4014 guarantees immunity from liability to any
person who reports or participates in an investigation or proceeding and does so in good faith.
See id. § 4014(1). Furthermore, Subsection 3 grants a rebuttable presumption of good faith. See
id. § 4014(3). Alternatively, any person who knowingly violates any of these provisions is
subject to civil charges which may not amount to more than a five hundred dollar fine. See id. §
4009.
153. See id § 4011(1).
154. See id § 4015.
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keep communications confidential is set aside in relation to the required reporting
and/or cooperation with investigations of known or suspected child abuse. 155
Although the list of professionals subject to the mandatory reporting law is
exhaustive, attorneys are not included in the list. 15 6 Whether a mere oversight or
a conscious decision, the legislative history of the law is silent. Nor do subsequent
amendments to the statute offer any guidance. Nonetheless, as there is no general
duty to report and attorneys are absent from the list of persons required to report,
in Maine, there is no statutory requirement that attorneys disclose information of
known or suspected child abuse obtained while acting in their professional capac-
ity. Alternatively, as the Maine statute permits any person to report known or
suspected child abuse, there would be no statutory conflict with an attorney choos-
ing to make such a report. In short, under the current statutory scheme, an attorney
in Maine is neither required to report nor prohibited from reporting known or sus-
pected child abuse.
V. MANDATORY REPORTING IS NOT THE ANSWER
Although this article argues that an attorney may disclose information per-
taining to child abuse obtained in the attorney-client relationship without violating
ethical rules or legislative enactments, attorneys should not be mandated to dis-
close such information.
It is undisputed that mandatory reporting laws have increased the number of
children who are reported to child protective agencies. 15 7 The increase in reports
has been consistent and dramatic in the thirty years since mandatory reporting
became the norm. In 1987, 2.2 million children were reportedly abused-more
than fourteen times the number reported between 1963 and 1987.158 By 1996, the
number increased to 3 million reports of child abuse. 159 No doubt, many thou-
sands of children have been saved from death and serious injury because of the
reporting laws. 16 0 Additional resources have been allocated to address the issue
155. If the Maine Legislature enacted a provision which either included attorneys specifi-
cally or, more generally, imposed a duty on all persons to report suspected child abuse, a lawyer,
depending on the precise language of the statute could have a duty under the law to report. If so,
the obligation "as required by law" would relieve the lawyer of any ethical constraints or obliga-
tions pursuant to the Maine Rules of Conduct. See ME. BAR. R. 3.6(h)(1).
156. Attorneys serving as guardians ad Jitem for "the child" are included as mandated report-
ers. Guardians, however, are appointed by the court to represent the best interest of the children.
Guardians do not represent parents in child protective services. See ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 4005 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). Thus, the attorney-client relationship is not implicated in the
same way it would be when the attorney is acting as counsel for her client.
157. Compare Douglas Besharov, Gaining Control over ChildAbuse Reports, PUB. WELFARE,
Spring 1990, at 36 (arguing that one consequence of mandatory reporting is "over reporting"
which undercuts efforts to prevent child abuse) with David Finkelhor, Is Child Abuse Over-
heated? The Data Rebut Arguments for Less Intervention, PUB. WELFARES, Winter 1990, at 23
(arguing that data do not reveal significant trouble with over-reporting as a result of mandatory
reporting).
158. See Douglas Besharov, Gaining Control over Child Abuse Reports, PUBLIC WELFARE,
Spring 1990, at 34-40 (hereinafter Besharov, Gaining Control).
159. See U.S. Dar OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., CHILDREN'S BUR., CHILD MALTREATMENT
1996: REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO THE NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM (1998).
160. See DOUGLAS J. BESHARov, RECOGNIZING CHILD ABUSE: A GUIDE FOR THE CONCERNED 10
(1990) (hereinafter BEsHAROv, RECOGNIZING CHILD ABUSE).
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of child maltreatment since the inception of reporting. 16 1 Yet, of great concern is
a study conducted by the United States Department of Health and Human Services
which estimates that 68% of the children who met the criteria for abuse and ne-
glect were not reported, yet, among reported cases, 56% were ruled to be unsub-
stantiated (reports which are dismissed after an investigation because of insuffi-
cient evidence upon which to proceed). 162 This suggests that mandatory reporting
may in fact be an unreliable tool in combating child mistreatment, leading to both
under-reporting and over-reporting. 163
Explanations for this phenomena differ. Under-reporting seems tied to a lack
of understanding of signs of child abuse and neglect, particularly with mandated
reporters who do not have a mental health background, as well as a lack of guid-
ance on what constitutes child abuse or a reasonable suspicion of abuse. This
suggests that abused children are being missed not because enough people are
mandated reporters, but rather because there is a significant education gap. The
solution, therefore, would be to enhance public and professional education. Spe-
cifically, child protective agencies, working in concert with other professionals,
need to "provide realistic guidance about deciding to report" such as educational
materials which clarify legal definitions of abuse and neglect, examples of report-
ing situations, how to recognize abuse and neglect and what to expect when a
report is made. 164 Again, problems of under-reporting are not necessarily going
to be solved by expanding the pool of mandated reporters.
Under-reporting by mental health professionals who are mandated reporters
seems to relate to concerns that the child welfare services are unable to respond to
reports. There is the additional concern that making a report will destroy the thera-
peutic relationship. These two concerns, however, seem related. To the extent that
a mental health professional doubts the child protective agency will respond to a
report, the professional will be less likely to sacrifice the therapeutic relationship. 165
"Over time, as mandated reporters have more experience with [child protective
agencies], they often learn ... that 'nothing would have been done' in response to
a report of only moderate abuse or neglect. [The] data suggest that mandated
reporters often begin to prescreen cases as they learn about [child protective agen-
cies'] operations and the enormous burdens under which these agencies labor. ' 166
This form of under-reporting is a direct reflection on the inadequate resources
devoted to child welfare-not a lack in the scope of the mandatory reporting laws. 167
161. See id. at 9.
162. See M.H. Meriwether, ChildAbuse Reporting Laws: Timefor a Change, in PR TEcnNo
CimDa N FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT Poucv Am PRAcnca 9 (Douglas Besharov, ed., 1988).
163. Besharov argues that often times the public's outrage at the stories of child abuse leads
to excessive regulation and state intervention into family systems. See Douglas J. Besharov,
"Doing Something" about Child Abuse: The Need to Narrow the Grounds for State Interven-
tion, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 539, 556- 79 (1985).
164. Id.
165. See Gail L. Zellman & Stephen Antler, Mandated Reporters and CPS: A Study in Frus-
tration, 48 PuBuc WELFARE 30, Winter 1990.
166. Id.
167. See Holly Watson & Murray Levine, Psychotherapy and Mandated Reporting of Child
Abuse, 59 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry, 246, 249 (1989) ("Some professionals prefer not to comply
with the mandatory reporting because the epidemic of reporting has not been matched by a rise
in appropriate services to help the child and family.").
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Professionals have also expressed concerns that "the intervention of social agen-
cies with the family will have harmful consequences; that removing the child from
the home may be more detrimental than allowing the child to stay... "168
The over-reporting of abuse is a significant problem as well. Some research-
ers have concluded that the rate of unfounded reports is as high as 65%.169 "Po-
tential reporters are frequently told to 'take no chances' and to report any child for
whom they have the slightest concern. There is a recent tendency to tell people to
report children whose behavior suggests that they may have been abused-even in
the absence of any other evidence of maltreatment." 170 Furthermore, for a mental
health professional who is clearly subject to the Tarasoffduty to warn, reporting of
relatively minor incidents is necessary to insulate him- or herself from potential
civil liability. Finally, the lack of family-oriented social service agencies has led to
an increase in reports to the child protection agencies for issues that, although
related to child welfare, are totally unrelated to abuse and neglect. 17 1 The child
protection agencies, designed to address reports of children in danger, are now
expected to provide "all encompassing child welfare." 172
The consequences of over-reporting pose significant dangers to child welfare.
"[T]he nation's child protective agencies are being inundated with 'unfounded'
reports."'17 3 Over-reporting significantly strains the already scarce resources of
child protective agencies, and they are then "less able to respond promptly and
effectively when children are in serious danger." 174
Most discussion of the successes and failures of mandatory reporting is taken
from the mental health profession's experience with the laws. Given that those
who work in the child protective field are forced to make the decision on whether
to report on a daily basis, it is appropriate that this discussion take place in their
field. Nonetheless, the failures of mandated reporting, as evidenced by the under-
and over-reporting of abuse, suggests that we should hesitate to engage attorneys
in this system.
It seems that the greatest danger in including attorneys as mandated reporters
is the fear of over-reporting. Given that mental health professionals find it diffi-
cult to evaluate the nature of abuse, it seems likely that attorneys would have even
greater difficulty making the same sorts of evaluations. To protect themselves
from potential liability, attorneys might feel compelled to "take no chances," mak-
ing reports that do not rise to the level of abuse or neglect. This seems very likely
where an attorney-reporter has no mental health background to rely upon to make
an evaluation of possible abuse. Any over-reporting by attorneys would place
additional pressures on the already overburdened child protective services in the
State of Maine.
There are other reasons for not making attorneys mandated reporters. Of the
many professionals who are mandated reporters under the Maine statute, all have
168. See id.
169. See Besharov, Gaining Control, supra note 158, at 36-37. But see Finkelhor, supra note
158, at 23 (challenging Besharov's data that abuse is over-reported).
170. See Besharov, Gaining Control, supra note 158, at 38.
171. See BESHAROV, REOGNIZING CHnw ABUSE, supra note 160, at 13.
172. See id.
173. Besharov, Gaining Control, supra note 158, at 36.
174. See id. at 38.
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some, albeit in some cases tangential, relationship to children. They are doctors or
teachers or members of law enforcement-members of the community who may
in fact regularly interact with children. Although the family law practitioner would
be the most likely candidate for contact with children, even there it is unclear that
attorneys are in the same category as other reporters. Attorneys are hired to repre-
sent the legal rights and responsibilities of their clients; in most cases they are not
employed in an effort to treat, teach, or protect children.
Nor can we ignore the importance of the attorney-client relationship. This
article has argued that there are cases where disclosure of otherwise confidential
information is appropriate and necessary to protect children. The potential for
damage to the attorney-client relationship is justified in those limited scenarios
given the competing interest in protecting children. However, if attorneys were
mandated reporters, and felt compelled to make a report on the slightest piece of
information in an effort to protect themselves from future liability, the consequences
to the attorney-client relationship would be significant. Once a report was made, it
seems likely that the trust between an attorney and the client would be strained,
particularly if the report concerned information that would not rise to the level of
abuse and neglect in the eyes of chid protective services. Representation of the
client would be difficult at the very least. Moreover, in cases where the conduct in
question did seem to be significant, an attorney who was a mandated reporter would
have no discretion to attempt to work with the client in an effort to address prob-
lems, nor could the attorney use the threat of disclosure to motivate a client to seek
help. The attorney would be required to make a report immediately.175
Ultimately, we must engage in a balancing act. No one in the mental health
profession seems to dispute that child abuse reporting laws have helped save
children's lives. However, an assumption of reporting laws is that they will lead to
early discovery of maltreatment symptoms and the prevention of further, more
serious injury or death. 176 Implicit in this assumption is that sufficient resources
will be allocated to adequately provide for prevention and treatment. Yet, funding
has been far from adequate. As noted above, the growing number of cases that
need to be investigated, and the lack of qualified staff, leave very few resources to
aid families that have been identified as those in trouble. If there comes a time
where we decide to fully fund child protective services such that any and all re-
ports can be adequately and quickly investigated, it may be that we can rethink the
issue of mandatory reporting. Until then, however, imposing this statutory man-
date on attorneys will increase the burden on state agencies, which has the poten-
tial of actually diverting resources from those who truly need help, and will sig-
nificantly alter the attorney-client relationship. Unless we can find a way to make
the benefits to children outweigh the potential harms to both children and the attor-
ney-client relationship, the scale tips in favor of flexibility. Attorneys must not be
mandatory reporters, instead they must have the discretion to report child abuse.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the community is confronted on a daily basis with the escalation of vio-
lence against children, we must reconsider traditional legal responses in light of
175. See Ms. REv. STAT. ANN. tt. 22, § 4011 (West 1964 & Supp. 1998).
176. See Hutchinson, supra note 6, at 56-63.
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modem problems. Legal statutes and ethical rules traditionally are written by adults
for adults. The laws presuppose that individuals affected by the law will at least
have the capacity to help themselves. But in the case of child abuse, where the
victims are young, vulnerable, and without physical and legal protection, special
protections must be afforded by the law.
As a general practice, an attorney should maintain a client's confidences. Yet,
in some cases, where an attorney learns that a client is abusing a child, the only
satisfactory option may be disclosure. Some commentators argue that the cost of
disclosure is so grave that confidentiality should transcend all other interests. This
view, however, "gives inordinate weight to the sanctity of the attorney-client rela-
tionship in light of important competing interests and ignores the countervailing
societal interest of discovering intended wrongdoing before it is perpetrated." 177
In the case of child abuse, attorneys must not turn a blind eye to this national crisis.
Attorneys must play a limited, but important, role in its prevention.
177. Stuart, supra note 4, at 259.
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